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Abstract 
This study investigates how managerial legal liability coverage, as measured by excessive 
managerial liability coverage, affect earnings restatements. Once managers mitigate their 
personal legal liability through managerial liability coverage, they may be more willing to 
misstate reported earnings. We test a sample of listed companies from Taiwan where D&O 
insurance are publicly available. We find that managers are more likely to misstate company’s 
earnings when they are covered by relatively higher excess managerial liability coverage. 
Moreover, we find that excessive managerial liability coverage couldn’t mitigate management 
legal liability concerns about material misrepresentation (e.g., core earnings restatements). In 
addition, several additional analyses are conducted and the results are robust and remain 
unchanged. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent accounting scandals have been preceded by or led to a restatement. Worldwide 
media coverage of the collapses and scandals that have rocked corporate Enron, America’s 
giants, WorldCom, and Tyco, appear to have shaken the confidence of investors. In the wake 
of these scandals, many of these companies saw their equity values plummet dramatically 
and experienced a decline in the credit ratings of their debt issues (Agawal and Chadha, 
2005). In recent years, as stock market valuations increased, management incentives to 
maintain earnings momentum and hence market valuations (Myers and Skinner, 2002), and 
beat analyst targets (DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). However, litigation concerns 
constrain aggressive reporting by managers. Prior research indicates that financial report 
restatements increase the risk of securities class actions (Jones and Weingram, 1997), 
arguing that managers have an incentive to report conservatively to reduce expected legal 
liability (Chung and Wynn, 2008). The objective of this paper investigates associations 
between accounting restatements and manager legal liability coverage. 
When a corporation announced financial restatement, directors and officers (hereafter 
D&O) face increasing responsibility, heightened time commitments and lower investor 
tolerance for performance and governance failures, all factors triggering potentially greater 
risks of litigation. Prior studies indicated that if managers accomplish the goal by higher 
level of earnings management, lawsuits will be successful and result in costly settlement 
(DuCharme et al., 2004). Because of higher litigation faced by managers, earnings 
management can be very costly (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). Though accounting fraud 
litigation especially that precipitated by a restatement of earnings is undoubtedly painful, 
D&O be lessened their personal legal liability if the company purchases D&O liability 
insurance coverage. This coverage is generally available to reimburse directors and officers 
for defense costs, judgments and settlements, even in cases of where a company admits that 
its financial statements are materially misleading. Indeed, liability insurance coverage is 
intended to protect D&O against higher litigation risk. Most empirical evidence supports that 
D&O liability insurance is associated with opportunism behavior of managers (Chung and 
Wynn, 2008; Wynn, 2008). A manager has more motivation to manipulate the firm’s 
earnings when his/her personal legal liability is covered by D&O insurance. Thus, we posit 
that the higher the D&O insurance coverage and cash for indemnification, reducing the 
expected legal liability of managers, more likely to make accounting restatements. 
Because D&O insurance information is not disclosed in the United States, we use 
Taiwanese sample to verify whether the managerial legal liability coverage is indeed a factor 
raising the earnings restatements. We employ excessive directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance coverage as a proxy for managerial opportunism behavior (Wynn, 2008; Chung 
and Wynn, 2008), which is available data from proxy statements. Our empirical evidence 
shows that reducing management legal liability has the effect of encouraging managers to 
misstate reported earning, even to violate GAAP, implying that managers with less litigation 
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risk lead to manipulate the firm’s earnings. Moreover, we find that excessive managerial 
liability coverage couldn’t mitigate management legal liability concerns about material 
misrepresentation (e.g., core earnings restatements).  
Our findings first contribute to the aggressive accounting literature by examining the 
association between managerial legal liability coverage and earnings restatement. Although 
extensive prior research examines whether variation in managers’ legal liability exposure is 
associated with opportunism accounting choice (Cheng and Wynn, 2008), empirical research 
of the association between managers’ legal liability exposure and accounting restatement is 
lacking. Our study provides the empirical evidence that managerial legal liability coverage is 
a determinant of earnings restatement. Second, our study conjectures and finds that excessive 
managerial liability coverage does not increase the probability that the firm will be subject to 
material misrepresentation (e.g., core earnings restatements), meaning that D&O liability 
coverage will not mitigate management legal liability concerns about core earnings 
restatement. The result also provides a useful incremental contribution to the literature on the 
consequences of non-GAAP reporting of earnings.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Several studies indicated the accounting restatements result in a substantial loss of market 
value describe declines in market capitalization when a company restates its earnings (e.g., 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny 1996; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004). SEC chairman, 
Arthur Levitt (2000) also stated, “In recent years, countless investors have suffered 
significant losses as market capitalizations have dropped by billions of dollars due to 
restatements.” Although restatements often result from innocent mistakes, accounting rules 
require financial statements to be restated if they contain material misstatements due to error 
or fraud. Nevertheless, restatements frequently trigger shareholder lawsuits or regulatory 
inquiries (Tseng, 2009). 
In recent years, litigation risk is potentially an important explanation of market reaction to 
restatement announcements, and empirical research has focused on the impact of litigation 
concerns on restatements, and therefore on reporting practices. Lev, Ryan, and Wu (2008) 
find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of positive earnings or of earnings 
growth trigger a negative market reaction to the restatement announcement and an increase 
in the likelihood of class action lawsuits. Other research on litigation indicates that 
restatements increase the risk of securities class actions (Jones and Weingram, 1997). They 
provide some evidence on restatements had stockholder suits or SEC enforcement actions. 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) provide evidence that about 38 percent of restating companies 
are sued, and those firms are sued because they restate commit fraud, make large earnings 
overstatements, economic issues, or experience unusually large stock price declines at the 
announcement. Also, Grundfest and Perino (1997) find that accounting matters comprise a 
greater share of securities litigation after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, that nearly half of the securities class action lawsuits filed 
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between 1996 and 1999 contain accounting allegations, and that nearly half of all companies 
sued for alleged accounting chicanery restate earnings (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000). 
Prior studies provide evidence that firms with expected litigation costs affect financial 
reporting decisions. Seetharaman et al. (2005) indicated that accounting conservatism 
declined after the PSLRA of 1995, suggesting that the reduced ex ante litigation risk 
influenced managers’ incentive to report conservatively. Ryan and Zarowin (2003) find 
consistent results that earnings overstatement increased in the 1996–2000 period, compared 
to the 1986–1995 period. Their findings indicate that firms with lower expected litigation 
risk show more exaggerated reported earnings. However, if managers manipulate the 
market’s perception of firm value, lawsuits are more likely to be filed and result in costly 
settlement (Jones and Wu, 2009). Once managers expose to higher litigation risk due to more 
severe earnings manipulation (DuCharme et al., 2004), they may reduce their motivation to 
exaggerate reported earnings. Therefore, earnings management can be very costly to 
managers because of higher litigation risk (Tseng, 2011). 
In generally, managers have an incentive to report aggressive earnings in order to increase 
their compensation, avoid debt covenant violations, and decrease the cost of capital (e.g., 
Dechow and Skinner, 2000). But litigation based on Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Act 
and Company Law, has a deterrent effect on managers’ aggressive accounting decisions. 
Prior study indicated that when managers with exposed to litigation, aggressive accounting 
be very costly (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). Thus, managers would strategically 
determine the optimal level of aggressive accounting, balancing the effect of their actions on 
the expected cost of a lawsuit and the expected benefits from more aggressive earnings 
(Cheng and Wynn, 2008). Though accounting fraud litigation especially that precipitated by 
a restatement of earnings is undoubtedly painful, D&O be lessened their personal legal 
liability if the company purchases D&O liability insurance coverage. Because D&O 
insurance typically covers managerial losses and mitigates managers’ litigation risk, 
managers will be more willing to engage in risk-taking behavior and use more aggressive 
financial reporting decision (Core, 1997; Chung and Wynn, 2008). Chung and Wynn (2008) 
provide evidence that firms with high D&O liability insurance tend to recognize bad news in 
a less timely manner and less conservative earnings. Hence, when D&O insurance coverage 
is unusually high, a manager may appear to be risk-neutral or even be risk-loving due to 
managerial opportunism behaviors. As mentioned above, managers’ expected legal liability 
is reduced via D&O insurance and indemnification, they took action with managerial 
opportunism behaviors. Therefore, we hypothesize that, all other things being equal, higher 
managerial legal liability coverage will lead to more likelihood of earnings restatement. 
Hypothesis 1:!The firms with higher the managerial legal liability coverage, have the 
more likelihood of earnings restatement. 
 
Recent public policy concerns over earnings management motivate focuses on core 
earnings of the income statement (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). Because core earnings which 
consist of primary operating earnings generated by repetitive business, considered persistent 
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or sustainable into future periods, they are more important to users than noncore earnings 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). Also, financial analysts report the core earnings of financial 
statement to investor (Blitzer, Friedman, and Silverblatt, 2002). Thus, managers have a 
higher incentive to manage core earnings in order to accomplish aggressive earnings levels. 
On the other hand, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) show that the mean lawsuit settlement was 
57.1 million for core restatements and 10.7 million for noncore restatements. Thus, the 
misstatements of core earnings are more important to users and plaintiffs anticipate that the 
judicial process will perceive these cases as more meritorious. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) 
found core earnings result in higher litigation risk for auditor. As mentioned above, D&O 
coverage is generally available to reimburse directors and officers for defense costs, 
judgments and settlements, even in cases of where a company admits that its financial 
statements are materially misleading of core earnings. Indeed, liability insurance coverage is 
intended to protect D&O against higher litigation risk arise from restatements of core 
earnings. Therefore, we hypothesize that, all other things being equal, higher managerial 
legal liability coverage will lead to more likelihood of financial reporting restatements of 
core earnings. 
Hypothesis 2:!The firms with higher the managerial legal liability coverage, have the 
more likelihood of core earnings restatements. 
 
3. Research design, sample selection, and data sources 
 
We first examine the association between D&O insurance coverage and accounting 
restatements using the following probit regression model: 
 
RES = E0+ E1 EXTOTAL+E2BOARDSIZE + E3OUTDIR+ E4 SIZE + + E5 LEV +E6 MB+E7RAISE+E8ROA +H         
(1) 
 
where RES is an indicator variable equal to one if the company restates its financial 
statement, and zero otherwise. We follow Chin and Chi (2009) each restating registrant is 
matched by selecting a nonrestaing registrant for the same (TEJ Industry Code) industry and 
year, and closet to the restating registrant in total assets, and drawn from in which the 
misstatement initially occurs. This paper considers the probability of an accounting 
misstatement at the time the misstatement occurs, not at the time when the misstatement is 
later disclosed publicly as an accounting restatement. Thus all independent and dependent 
variables indicate auditor and firm characteristics at the time when the misstatement occurs, 
and not at the time when the misstatement is announced (Richardson et al. 2003; Myer et al. 
2005; Barber et al. 2006). Moreover, this paper has the prediction is that managers with 
higher excessive D&O insurance coverage are more likely to restate core earnings. The 
Equation (2) is as follows: 
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CORE_EARNINGS = E0+ E1 EXTOTAL +E2BOARDSIZE + E3OUTDIR+ E4 SIZE + + E5 LEV +E6 
MB+E7RAISE+E8ROA +H    (2) 
 
Following Palmrose et al. (2004), we define core-earnings restatements as those involving 
revenue, cost of sales or on-going operating expenses. In addition, non-core earnings are 
defined as those from all other activities. Thus, we included core earnings variable which is 
an indicator variable (CORE_EARNINGS) for companies with (without) core restatements 
(1=core restatement, 0 =otherwise). 
We are primarily concerned with the signs of the excess D&O legal liability coverage 
variable. Prior studies suggest that D&O insurance and indemnification, which lowers 
directors’ and officers’ personal legal liability, might also affect voluntary disclosures and 
earnings conservatism (Chung and Wynn, 2008; Wynn, 2008). Thus, following the measure 
of excess D&O legal liability coverage (EXTOTAL), we use D&O liability insurance 
coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage and 
then test the relationship between accounting restatements and the excess D&O coverage 
limits. First, we estimate excess D&O liability coverage limits (beyond the expected 
coverage that a firm would carry) through using the residuals from the regression of D&O 
insurance coverage on determinants of D&O insurance coverage limits. Second, we estimate 
excess cash for D&O indemnification through using the residual from the regression of cash 
on determinants of cash holdings. Finally, the total excess coverage (EXTOTAL) is measured 
as the sum of excess D&O coverage limits and excess cash for indemnification. 
Dechow et al. (1996) posit that larger boards may result in ineffectual monitoring due to a 
proclivity toward communication breakdowns and inefficiencies. Abbott, Parker, and Peters 
(2004) show a positive relation between board size and the incidence of restatement. Thus, 
we include the BOARDSIZE variable that defined as the number of board members. Beasley 
(1996) posits that outside directors have reputational capital incentives to more actively 
monitor management and minimize management actions that require subsequent restatement. 
We define OUTDIR as the percentage of oudside directors serving on the board and expect a 
negative relation between OUTDIR and restatement. The SIZE equals the natural logarithm 
of market value. We include SIZE as control variable since prior studies indicate that large 
firms are more likely to make restatements (Myers et al., 2005; Baber et al, 2006). ROA 
equals the net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. LEV equals total 
liabilities divided by total assets. We include ROA and LEV as control variables since prior 
research finds that restatement companies tend to be less profitable (ROA) and have higher 
leverage (LEV) than non-restating companies (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1991). We control for firm growth by including market-to-book ratio (MB) as 
additional independent variables because the market-to-book ratio for the restating 
companies (Richardson et al. 2003; Jagadison, Aier, Gunlock, and Lee 2005). Further, 
Finally, RAISE is the sum of additional cash raised from the issuance of common and 
preferred stock and the issuance of long-term debt, deflated by average total assets. We 
include RAISE in equation (1) and (2) since restatement firms are typically active in external 
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capital markets (Richardson et al., 2003). YEAR includes a set of dummy variables 
representing the fiscal year. INDUSTRY includes a set of dummy variables representing 
industry. 
4. Empirical results 
Our sample consists of Taiwanese listed firms for the period of 2006-2009 on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (TSE). The D&O insurance data are publicly available in proxy statements 
because the TSFB has required firms to disclose the existence of a D&O insurance policy 
since the end of 2007. Financial data and accounting restatements were obtained from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal (hereafter TEJ) Database. Our initial sample consists of 207 
events announced by 176 firms identified by the TSFB or Companies/auditors for the years 
2007 and 2009. 
Table 1 reports estimation results after controlling for other factors that could affect 
accounting restatements. In model (1) shows that the coefficient of excess total coverage is 
significantly negative for restatements firms at the one percent significance level. This results 
indicate that manager with higher excess coverage behave opportunistically by restated 
financial statements. In model (2), when excess total coverage is split into excess cash for 
indemnification (EXCASH) and excess D&O coverage (EXCOV), the coefficient of EXCASH 
is significantly positive for restatements firms. But, the coefficient of EXCOV is marginally 
significant positive for restatements firms. Further, there is difference in the coefficients for 
both these two managerial liability coverage, indicating that differential restatements due to 
reduce the expected  legal liability of managers are driven more by excess cash for 
indemnification (EXCASH) than by excess D&O coverage (EXCOV). This result implies that 
excess cash for indemnification is more important to managers’ fraud behavior than excess 
D&O coverage. Consistent with Wynn (2008) findings, since indemnification is allowed 
even in criminal cases as long as managers have acted in good faith for the best interests of 
the firm, while typical D&O insurance requires scrutiny for payments and has the right to 
rescind coverage due to material misrepresentations made with an intent to deceive. Overall, 
our results demonstrated that the managers with high liability coverage can be viewed as 
more opportunistic, since their legal liability concerns are already mitigated by D&O liability 
coverage. 
Table 1 
Results from regression of Accounting Restatements on Excess D&O Insurance 
Coverage  
      
Model (1) 
 
 
  
Model (2) 
Control 
Variables 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
EXTOTAL  +  4.402 4.28***    
EXCOV  +     2.319 1.69*   
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EXCASH  +     6.959 4.48*** 
BOARDSIZE  +  -0.047 -0.80     -0.047 -0.79    
OUTDIR    -0.754 -0.82     -0.609 -0.67    
SIZE    0.310 0.74     0.343 0.78    
LEV  +  1.608 1.76*    1.879 2.00**  
ROA     -0.077 4.57***  -0.071 -4.29*** 
MB  +  0.005 0.05     -0.072 0.55    
RAISE  +  -2.865 -0.92     -1.202 -0.40    
Intercept  ?  -1.802 -0.47     -2.149 -0.53    
YEAR    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY    Yes   Yes  
         
Log pseudo likelihood  -148.272   -145.383  
Pseudo R2    0.171   0.187  
N    258   258  
 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating regression (2). In testing the statistical significance 
of the coefficient estimates, we use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on 
companies (Rogers, 1994). Model (1) analyzes the effect core earnings restatements on 
excess legal liability coverage. It reveals that the coefficient on EXTOTAL is not statistically 
significant. In model (2), when excess D&O insurance coverage (EXCOV) and excess cash 
(EXCASH) are used, only EXCASH is marginally significant negative at the 10 percent level, 
implicating that management legal liability concerns about core earnings restatement 
couldn’t be mitigated by liability coverage. Our result shows the no association between core 
earnings restatements and managerial legal liability coverage. There are several reasons. First, 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) indicated that companies with core earnings restatements have 
higher frequencies of intentional misstatements (fraud) and subsequent bankruptcy or 
delisting. Second, according to the civic code in Taiwan, companies only indemnified their 
directors and officers against claims when they acted in good faith and in a manner 
reasonably believed to be in, and not opposed to, the best interests of the company. Thus, if 
directors and officers who admit fraud arising from material core restatements, companies 
should immediately prohibit indemnification. Third, the company may be unable to provide 
indemnification because of material misrepresentation leading to financial distress and if 
managers are turnover following material restatements, the succeeding managers may be 
unwilling to indemnify predecessor managers following a change in control (Core, 2000). 
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Table 2 
Results from regression of Core Earnings Restatements on Excess D&O Insurance 
Coverage 
      
Model (1) 
 
 
  
Model (2) 
Control 
Variables 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
EXTOTAL  +  1.707 1.59       
EXCOV  +     3.314 1.00    
EXCASH  +     1.437 1.72*   
BOARDSIZE  +  -0.056 -0.48     -0.039 -0.34    
OUTDIR    0.652 0.48     0.423 0.28    
SIZE    0.374 0.54     0.300 0.41    
LEV  +  2.892 1.89*    3.053 1.91**  
ROA     -0.068 -3.07***  -0.070 -2.91*** 
MB  +  0.195 1.24     0.246 1.29    
RAISE  +  -1.445 -0.27     -3.335 -0.42    
Intercept  ?  -5.887 -0.95     -5.359 -0.83    
YEAR    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY    Yes   Yes  
         
Log pseudo likelihood  -58.313   -58.057  
Pseudo R2    0.306   0.309  
N    129   129  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
TSFB required listed firms should disclose more information on D&O insurance. The 
publicly available data provide us with a setting to examine how D&O liability coverage 
affect the incidence of earnings restatement. We use a sample of listed firms in Taiwan 
where require publicly-owned companies disclose the details of their insurance policies and 
employ excessive D&O liability coverage as a proxy for managerial opportunism.Prior 
studies on the effect of D&O liability coverage on earnings quality adopt various measures to 
proxy for earnings quality, such as discretionary accruals and earnings conservatism. 
Although high accruals and less conservatism may proxy for the poor quality of financial 
restatements, these may not arise from a violation of GAAP. However, our paper focuses 
exclusively on earnings restatements arising from the violation of GAAP, which arguably 
impose greater costs on firms and investors (e.g., Palmrose et al., 2004). 
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